Що така си затри поста? Айде от мен да мине, по-обстойно разгледана новината:
Полша открито е заявявала пред Хитлер готовността си, заедно с нацистка Германия, да се бори срещу Съветския съюз
.......

За разлика от теб давам и линк:
http://pogled.info/svetoven/polsha-otkrito-e-zayavyavala-pred-hitler-gotovnostta-si-zaedno-s-natsistka-germaniya-da-se-bori-sreshtu-savetskiya-sayuz.88343

On October 24, 1938, Ribbentrop told Polish Ambasssador Jozef Lipski (1894-1958, Minister, then Ambassador in Berlin, 1932-39, later in the West), that Germany could offer Poland a "general settlement" of all outstanding questions. Ribbentrop proposed that: (1) Poland agree to the abrogation of Danzig’s status as a Free City and its return to the Reich, while preserving all its rights there, also to a German extra-territorial highway and railway through the Polish Corridor to Danzig and East Prussia; (2) Poland would join the "Anti-Comintern Pact."* In return, Germany would guarantee the Polish-German frontier and extend the Declaration of Nonaggression of 1934 for 25 years.
*[Oct.25, 1936, German-Italian Pact; Nov. 26. 1936, German-Japanese Pact; Nov. 6, 1937, Italian-Japanese Pact against the Comintern. These pacts came to be known as the Anti-Comintern Pact].

Polish Foreign Minister Jozef Beck (1894-1944, For. Min. 1932-39) instructed Lipski to give a negative answer on Danzig , but say that negotiations were possible to improve German railway traffic and on building a German highway through the Polish Corridor. This seems to be have been a gambit to gain time, and there is no trace of any agreement by the Polish "Castle Council" (President, For. Min., Army Chief,and selected others meeting in the President's rooms in the Royal Castle, Warsaw) to this project. Finally, Beck said nothing to the invitation to join the Anti-Comintern Pact, which was equivalent to a refusal.

Ribbentrop’s proposal seems quite reasonable. However, we know what Hitler’s real intentions were from information given by the Danzig "Gauleiter" (Party district leader) Albert Forster (1902-1950) to the League of Nations High Commissioner in Danzig, Carl Jakob Burckhardt (1891-1974, in Danzig 1937-39). In November 1938, Forster told him what he had just heard from Hitler: The Fuhrer said he would guarantee Polish frontiers for his own lifetime - but only if the Poles were "reasonable like the Czechs." Burckhardt heard the same phrase from German State Secretary Ernst von Weizsacker when he visited Berlin in December 1938. Thus, it is clear that Hitler’s aim was to make Poland subservient to Germany. *

*[for details and references to doc. sources, see info. below on Ribbentrop visit to Warsaw, Jan. 26, 1939.]

Beck played for time and worked for closer relations with Britain. In this he succeeded, for on December 15, 1938, the British government stated that it would not approve any changes in the status of Danzig without first consulting with the Polish government. This meant a defeat for Georges Bonnet, who was pushing for the removal of the High Commissioner from Danzig as well as the abolition of all League of Nations involvement in the Free City. This French proposal to Britain came on the heels of the introduction of antisemitic legislation in Danzig by Forster in November 1938, just after attacks on Jews all over Germany known as the "Crystal Night" because of the broken glass.
Halifax rejected Bonnet's proposal because he believed that Britain might need Col. Beck in the future. It is not clear what Halifax meant by this phrase, but it seems that he saw Beck as a Polish statesman who would be willing to give Hitler what he wanted by negotiation, thus avoiding war. In any case, Halifax certainly believed that the issue could be settled peacefully.

In December 1938, with the next League of Nations session in the offing, Beck requested a meeting with Hitler to find out whether his views on Danzig and the Corridor were the same as Ribbentrop’s. The meeting took place in Berchtesgaden on January 5, 1939. Hitler repeated the Ribbentrop proposals of Oct. 24, 1938, to which Beck answered that he saw no equivalent for a Polish agreement that Danzig return to Germany. Ribbentrop pressed Beck on the same issue next day, and received the same answer.

On returning to Warsaw, Beck thought briefly of taking up a phrase Hitler used, when he suggested a new organism, a "Korperschaft" (corporation) to safeguard Polish and German interests in Danzig. Beck thought that some sort of "condominium" or joint Polish-German administration might provide a solution. However, the Castle Council decided that no such Polish proposal should be made because it would be the first step on the slippery slope to the loss of Polish independence. B eck agreed.

There is no clue as to what Hitler might have meant by "corporation," but the whole thrust of Nazi propaganda in the Free City -- which the Nazis ruled since winning the elections in the FCD territory in May 1935 -- was "Heim ins Reich!" (Home to Germany). Therefore, it is possible to assume that whatever Hitler may have meant by corporation," it would have meant German sovereignty. Neither the Polish government nor public opinion could agree to this or to an extraterritorial German Corridor through the Polish Corridor, because then Germany could choke off Poland’s access to the sea. Furthermore, even a narrow German corridor through Polish Corridor would mean putting Polish people under German rule. (Many still remembered the heavy-handed Germanization policies in former Prussian, now western Poland.)

On January 26, 1939, Ribbentrop paid an official visit to Warsaw to celebrate the fifth anniversary of the Polish-German Declaration of Nonaggression. of Jan. 26, 1934. However, his real objective was to secure Beck’s agreement to the proposals which he and Hitler had made earlier. He also tempted Beck with vistas of Polish expansion into the Soviet Ukraine, even as far as the Black Sea, but Beck did not take up the offer. Finally, they agreed that neither country would act unilaterally if the League of Nations withdrew from Danzig.* Nevertheless, German leaders still hoped to isolate Poland so that the Polish government would finally accept their "reasonable" proposals. *

*[On German-Polish relations, Polish and British policy toward Poland in the period October- 1938 - end January 1939, see Anna M.Cienciala, Poland and the Western Powers, 1938-1939. A Study in the Interdependence of Eastern and Western Europe, London, Toronto, 1968, ch.V. For an updated study including the Forster-Burckhardt conversation, see same: "Poland in British and French Policy in 1939: Determination to Fight or Avoid War,?" Polish Review, vol. XXXIV, no. 3, New York, 1989, pp. 199-226, reprinted with some abbreviations in Patrick Finney, ed., The Origins of the Second World War, London, 1997.]
...
On March 25, Beck told German ambassador in Warsaw, Hans Adolf von Moltke, that Poland could not accept the German proposals received on 21 March, ( a repetition of the previous German demands). Then he instructed Lipski to tell Ribbentrop that Poland could not agree to the proposals. Lipski delivered this message to Ribbentrop on March 26. Meanwhile, the day before, on March 25, on hearing of the Polish refusal, Hitler had issued a directive to the head of the German army, General Wilhelm Keitel. Hitler said he did not want to drive Poland into the arms of Britain. However, as soon as an opportunity arose, he would crush Poland so badly that she would not play a role in European politics for decades to come. He planned to annex western Poland, ( more or less the territory of Prussian Poland in 1914), whos Polish population was to be "evacuated" and resettled elsewhere.
....

On August 27, (1939) Chamberlain told the Cabinet that Poland could at most accept the return of Danzig to Germany and a German extra-territorial highway and railway through the Corridor. He said this despite the fact that the Polish government had always viewed this solution as unacceptable. Therefore, Chamberlain was expressing his opinion, and not that of Britain’s ally.

Hitler made an apparent ploy for peace, but German armed forces had orders to attack Poland on September 1, so his aim was to place the blame for war on the Poles. At midnight on August 29, Ribbentrop quickly read to the British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, a list of terms for Poland which would allegedly ensure peace. Danzig was to return to Germany but Poland would keep its rights there; there was to be a plebiscite in the Polish Corridor, but all Poles who were born or settled there since early 1919 would have no vote, while all Germans born, even if not living there, would. (Hitler did not seem to realize that there was a Polish majority in this region according to the Prussian census of 1910, see Lec. Notes 11, The Rebirth of Poland). Poland would have guaranteed access to the sea. There would be an exchange of minority populations between the two countries. If Poland accepted these terms, Germany would agree to the British offer of an international guarantee, but this would now include the Soviet Union. A Polish plenipotentiary (with full powers) was to arrive in Berlin to accept these terms by noon the next day.

«Польша в первой половине 30-х годов представляла гитлеровскую Германию в Лиге наций. После известного Мюнхенского сговора по разделу Чехословакии именно Польша, не являясь формально участницей этого сговора, присоединила к себе насильственно значительную часть Чехословакии. Поэтому переваливать с больной головы на здоровую, пытаясь на СССР возложить наряду с гитлеровской Германией ответственность за начало Второй мировой войны, - это безнравственно, безответственно и антиисторически», - напомнил сенатор.

Firmin
13 Авг 2017 18:29
Мнения: 30,239
От: Bulgaria
Скрий: Име,IP

И като даваш линк какво?

С такива линкове се илюстрира поговорката, че лъжата обикаля света, докато истината още си обува ботушите.

Некои просто не могат да си представят , че може в една страна да има множество , че и различни интерпретации и то по ключови въпроси, зер това е една от чертите на демокрацията.

Истинската история, такава, каквато е, е че бъдещето на споменатите нации и "формирования" се определя не от тях, а от този, който може да си го позволи. Дали Молотов с Рибентроп или пък Сталин с Чърчил и Рузвелт, но бъдещето на Полша за десетилетия се е определяло на маса, на която тя не е поканена и в кръг, в който не е включена. Това е истинската история. Другото е пропаганда. Което е дадено на Юпитер, не е дадено на вола му. Факт. Исторически.

Политика поддерживать хорошие отношения и с Германией, и с СССР завершилась тем, что Польша стала навязывать себя в качестве союзника фашистской Германии.

Ама колко сте ми сладички, партнърчетата! Бели, та пухкави. Що, с присъщата си любов към истинската история, веднъж се не объркахте ей тоз документ да подложите на дискусия?