Напротив Sasoss, не ги пропускам. Но не пропускам и изявленията на един друг човек, който от преврата в Чили насам има решаващ глас във външната политика на американците. Няма да се учудя ако той е бил навремето бисквитката улучила днешният храст.
Понеже знам, че си любознателен
, ти пействам статиите, които имах пред вид.
Предполагам че и за извънземното ще са интересни
Don't Attack Saddam
It would undermine our antiterror efforts.
BY BRENT SCOWCROFT
Thursday, August 15, 2002 12:01 a.m. EDT , Wallstreet JournalOur nation is presently engaged in a debate about whether to launch a war against Iraq. Leaks of various strategies for an attack on Iraq appear with regularity. The Bush administration vows regime change, but states that no decision has been made whether, much less when, to launch an invasion.
It is beyond dispute that Saddam Hussein is a menace. He terrorizes and brutalizes his own people. He has launched war on two of his neighbors. He devotes enormous effort to rebuilding his military forces and equipping them with weapons of mass destruction. We will all be better off when he is gone.
That said, we need to think through this issue very carefully. We need to analyze the relationship between Iraq and our other pressing priorities--notably the war on terrorism--as well as the best strategy and tactics available were we to move to change the regime in Baghdad.
Saddam's strategic objective appears to be to dominate the Persian Gulf, to control oil from the region, or both.
That clearly poses a real threat to key U.S. interests. But there is scant evidence to tie Saddam to terrorist organizations, and even less to the Sept. 11 attacks. Indeed Saddam's goals have little in common with the terrorists who threaten us, and there is little incentive for him to make common cause with them.
He is unlikely to risk his investment in weapons of mass destruction, much less his country, by handing such weapons to terrorists who would use them for their own purposes and leave Baghdad as the return address. Threatening to use these weapons for blackmail--much less their actual use--would open him and his entire regime to a devastating response by the U.S. While Saddam is thoroughly evil, he is above all a power-hungry survivor.
Saddam is a familiar dictatorial aggressor, with traditional goals for his aggression. There is little evidence to indicate that the United States itself is an object of his aggression. Rather, Saddam's problem with the U.S. appears to be that we stand in the way of his ambitions. He seeks weapons of mass destruction not to arm terrorists, but to deter us from intervening to block his aggressive designs.
Given Saddam's aggressive regional ambitions, as well as his ruthlessness and unpredictability, it may at some point be wise to remove him from power. Whether and when that point should come ought to depend on overall U.S. national security priorities. Our pre-eminent security priority--underscored repeatedly by the president--is the war on terrorism. An attack on Iraq at this time would seriously jeopardize, if not destroy, the global counterterrorist campaign we have undertaken.
The United States could certainly defeat the Iraqi military and destroy Saddam's regime. But it would not be a cakewalk. On the contrary, it undoubtedly would be very expensive--with serious consequences for the U.S. and global economy--and could as well be bloody. In fact, Saddam would be likely to conclude he had nothing left to lose, leading him to unleash whatever weapons of mass destruction he possesses.
Israel would have to expect to be the first casualty, as in 1991 when Saddam sought to bring Israel into the Gulf conflict. This time, using weapons of mass destruction, he might succeed, provoking Israel to respond, perhaps with nuclear weapons, unleashing an Armageddon in the Middle East. Finally, if we are to achieve our strategic objectives in Iraq, a military campaign very likely would have to be followed by a large-scale, long-term military occupation.
But the central point is that any campaign against Iraq, whatever the strategy, cost and risks, is certain to divert us for some indefinite period from our war on terrorism. Worse, there is a virtual consensus in the world against an attack on Iraq at this time. So long as that sentiment persists, it would require the U.S. to pursue a virtual go-it-alone strategy against Iraq, making any military operations correspondingly more difficult and expensive. The most serious cost, however, would be to the war on terrorism. Ignoring that clear sentiment would result in a serious degradation in international cooperation with us against terrorism. And make no mistake, we simply cannot win that war without enthusiastic international cooperation, especially on intelligence.
Possibly the most dire consequences would be the effect in the region. The shared view in the region is that Iraq is principally an obsession of the U.S. The obsession of the region, however, is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If we were seen to be turning our backs on that bitter conflict--which the region, rightly or wrongly, perceives to be clearly within our power to resolve--in order to go after Iraq, there would be an explosion of outrage against us. We would be seen as ignoring a key interest of the Muslim world in order to satisfy what is seen to be a narrow American interest.
Even without Israeli involvement, the results could well destabilize Arab regimes in the region, ironically facilitating one of Saddam's strategic objectives. At a minimum, it would stifle any cooperation on terrorism, and could even swell the ranks of the terrorists. Conversely, the more progress we make in the war on terrorism, and the more we are seen to be committed to resolving the Israel-Palestinian issue, the greater will be the international support for going after Saddam.
If we are truly serious about the war on terrorism, it must remain our top priority. However, should Saddam Hussein be found to be clearly implicated in the events of Sept. 11, that could make him a key counterterrorist target, rather than a competing priority, and significantly shift world opinion toward support for regime change.
In any event, we should be pressing the United Nations Security Council to insist on an effective no-notice inspection regime for Iraq--any time, anywhere, no permission required. On this point, senior administration officials have opined that Saddam Hussein would never agree to such an inspection regime. But if he did, inspections would serve to keep him off balance and under close observation, even if all his weapons of mass destruction capabilities were not uncovered. And if he refused, his rejection could provide the persuasive casus belli which many claim we do not now have. Compelling evidence that Saddam had acquired nuclear-weapons capability could have a similar effect.
In sum, if we will act in full awareness of the intimate interrelationship of the key issues in the region, keeping counterterrorism as our foremost priority, there is much potential for success across the entire range of our security interests--including Iraq. If we reject a comprehensive perspective, however, we put at risk our campaign against terrorism as well as stability and security in a vital region of the world.
A debate begins
Aug 22nd 2002 / WASHINGTON, DC
From The Economist print edition THE Republicans used to boast that they wanted a clear result in Iraq—regime change—but the Democrats only wanted a debate about it. Well, a debate of sorts has begun, and it is taking place largely on the Republican side.
It began on July 31st with hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. These provided a serious look at the issues. What weapons does Saddam Hussein have? What are his intentions? How solid is the opposition? Unfortunately, the testimony came from outside the administration—from think-tankers, defence experts and Iraqi scholars. These people all know a great deal about the technicalities, but they have no authority to take decisions.
The same point could be made about innumerable Pentagon leaks of possible war plans, which have filled newspapers this summer. These have revealed some sense of the scale of operations—anything up to 100,000 troops—and a sense of the caution of the joint chiefs of staff. Tommy Franks, the head of Central Command, this week said he is drawing up plans to give the president “credible options”. But that is all they are—options.
So when Brent Scowcroft, George Bush senior's national-security chief, wrote an article for the Wall Street Journal on August 15th called “Don't Attack Saddam”, it was the first sign of serious political debate. Mr Scowcroft argued that there was no real evidence tying the Iraqi dictator to terrorism. An attempt to overthrow him could destabilise the region and distract America from its real target, al-Qaeda.
Mr Scowcroft's broadside had echoes among mainstream Republican internationalists. A former secretary of state in the first Bush administration, Lawrence Eagleburger, concurred that Iraq was not necessarily public enemy number one. Senator Dick Lugar of Indiana chimed in: “Unless we plan this carefully, we're likely to destabilise other countries in the Middle East.” Chuck Hagel of Nebraska admitted that “Iraq is a threat”, but said that America has other interests: “Afghanistan...the Israeli-Palestinian issue...India-Pakistan”.
They stopped short of opposing an invasion outright—arguing it should be done carefully. Dick Armey, a congressman from Texas, was blunter. Mr Hussein, he said, has not shown “sufficient provocation” and “we Americans do not make unprovoked attacks.” Since Mr Armey is technically number two in the Republican Party's congressional hierarchy (though he is retiring this year), this looked like a serious rift in party ranks.
Certainly the debate so far has shown a few things. It reflects some differences within the administration. But the debate among Mr Bush's people seems less about whether to remove Mr Hussein than about the importance of what happens next. It is mainly between those (like Paul Wolfowitz, the number two at Defence) who just want to see the back of him and those (like Colin Powell) who want to focus discussion on how Iraq ought to be governed after Mr Hussein's removal, and whether to postpone an attack until there is some semblance of a government-in-readiness.
The debate also reflects a wider difference within the Republican Party. “Realists” want to get rid of Mr Hussein before he acquires nuclear weapons and destabilises the region. More ideological Reaganites want to get rid of Mr Hussein in order to destabilise the region—that is, to install a more democratic government in Iraq as a first step to changing autocratic regimes throughout the Middle East.
Reflecting such differences is one thing; but the debate so far hardly amounts to a serious split in the current Republican ranks. The most vocal dissenters are retired officials; and even their views need to be balanced, because some grand old internationalists support Mr Bush.
Writing in the Washington Post , Henry Kissinger, who probably carries more weight with the current administration than Mr Scowcroft, supported attacking Iraq. The erstwhile secretary of state admitted that few allies would support such an assault (something the New York Times seized upon with relish). But he disagreed with Mr Scowcroft's argument that it should be done only after calming down the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Another reason why the current debate feels like a phoney war is that it has not been partisan. With a couple of exceptions, everyone involved has been Republican. Few Democrats, with mid-term elections ten weeks away, want to distract themselves from domestic issues to engage in a national-security debate.
Lastly, the debate has hardly involved the White House. The closest it has got to overt participation was a much ballyhooed interview that Condoleezza Rice gave to the BBC, in which Mr Bush's national-security adviser ramped up the rhetoric by talking about “a very powerful moral case for regime change.” But the administration has not been out in the public sphere much: it has neither responded to criticism nor explained itself in detail.
There are good reasons for this: an unwillingness to signal war plans; the risk of raising expectations too early. But other excuses seem peculiar—notably the idea that “we can't engage in a debate until after we've taken a decision.” One result is that few of Mr Bush's critics, particularly outside America, have changed their minds. As Mr Kissinger admitted, “the president has made the intellectual case, he has not yet created the political framework.”
Making the case
Aug 22nd 2002
From The Economist Global AgendaPresident George Bush has repeated that he remains committed to a “regime change” in Iraq, but has sought to dampen what he called a “frenzy” of speculation about imminent American military action. His administration's plans for dealing with Iraq have faced criticism from some unexpected quarters
THE WHITE HOUSE was keen to quash the perception that a meeting at President George Bush's Texan ranch on August 21st with his most senior defence officials amounted to a council of war over Iraq. Indeed, after the meeting, Mr Bush said that the topic had not come up. But he insisted that he remained committed to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Iraq's president. “Regime change,” he said “is in the interests of the world," said the president. But there was also an emphasis on the "consultation and deliberation” necessary to achieve it.
Throughout the welter of press speculation, congressional comment, leaked invasion plans, outraged objections from foreign statesmen and occasional cheering roars of support, Mr Bush has consistently taken this line: that he has not yet made up his mind about how to rid the world of the Iraqi dictator. But nor has he flinched from that stated goal. America's army is reportedly moving equipment into the region, and senior figures in Mr Bush's administration are talking of the need to topple the “evil” Mr Hussein whether or not he reopens his country to United Nations weapons inspectors. So speculation that an attack on Iraq is possible in the next few months will not go away.
But the administration still has work to do in convincing America and its friends and allies of the merits of military action. Dan Bartlett, Mr Bush's director of communications has promised that if Mr Bush decides that “we need to take action to minimise the threat” that Mr Hussein now poses, then “he will do so in a way that will clearly be articulated to the American people” and its foreign partners. It seems the administration is gearing itself up to rally support for a war as, in Mr Bartlett's words, “a noble cause”.
The stress on winning the battle for public opinion followed a few days in which the administration had found itself subject to criticism for its Iraq policy not just from its habitual opponents, but from some of its most respected supporters. Brent Scowcroft, national security adviser to Mr Bush's father when he was president, wrote in a newspaper column that an attack on Iraq could “jeopardise, if not destroy, the global counter-terrorist campaign we have undertaken”. There was even speculation that Mr Scowcroft was conveying concern felt by the elder Mr Bush, another of whose former advisers, Lawrence Eagleburger, a former secretary of state, added his voice to those of the doubters. Even Henry Kissinger, most famous of all former Republican secretaries of state, and rarely categorised as a dove, expressed reservations, writing in the Washington Post that “America's special responsibility is to work towards an international system that rests on more than military power.” Doubts were also aired by Dick Armey, leader of the Republican majority in the House of Representatives.
None of these Republicans—and few of America's allies—would quibble with the Bush administration's assertion that Mr Hussein is evil. Most would also accept that he is a danger to his people, the region and, ultimately, America, and is, on the balance of evidence, maintaining and developing an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. Iraq's latest offer to resume talks on readmitting UN weapons inspectors, last Friday, again fell far short of the unconditional acceptance of unfettered, intrusive inspection that the UN Security Council has long demanded. There is widespread agreement that getting rid of Mr Hussein would be a good thing. What the administration has yet to show the doubters, however, is, in Mr Eagleburger's words, “why we have to do it now, when all our allies are opposed to it.”
The worry that Mr Scowcroft, in particular, stressed was that Iraq might, as in the 1991 Gulf war, launch missile attacks against Israel, perhaps even using some of the chemical or biological weapons a war would be intended to destroy. Israel has insisted that, if attacked again, it will, unlike in 1991, retaliate. Since it is widely believed to be an undeclared nuclear power this is a terrible prospect (albeit one at which Israel would have to hint to maintain credible deterrence for its supposed nuclear arsenal).
The fear of what Mr Scowcroft called “Armageddon in the Middle East” is one reason why so many countries in the region are lining up—in public at least—to condemn the prospective invasion. This weekend the king of Bahrain, on his first visit to Iran since the 1979 Islamic revolution there, agreed a joint statement with his hosts expressing “determined opposition to any unilateral military action against Iraq”. Saudi Arabia has ruled out the use of its territory as a base for an attack. Jordan's King Abdullah has been trying to rally opposition to an invasion. Turkey, an important regional ally and a member of NATO, is also wary of a war that might inflame Kurdish separatism, at a time when it faces economic and political turmoil.
Russia, a permanent member of the UN's Security Council, and an old friend of Iraq, has signalled the commercial importance of its ties there by announcing a five-year bilateral economic co-operation agreement, worth some $40 billion.
Even in western Europe, Mr Bush is short of support for an attack on Iraq. Among European Union leaders only Tony Blair, Britain's prime minister, is an enthusiastic backer of the argument that inaction is not an option in face of the threat posed by Mr Hussein. But he appears rather isolated both within his ruling Labour Party at home and within the EU. America has felt the need to go so far as to lodge a diplomatic rebuke with Germany after the chancellor, Gerhard Schr?der, who faces elections next month, described a possible war as “an adventure”.
So far, of course, any war, whether “noble cause” or “adventure” remains a phoney one, and all of the American administration's statements have to be seen in the context not just of the battle for international and domestic public opinion, but of a psychological tussle with Mr Hussein. The Iraqi dictator may feel some satisfaction that so many weighty voices have spoken out against an invasion that is so far only conjecture. Or, recognising that Mr Bush and his team have neither fully launched a campaign to rally support for military action, nor faltered for an instant in their stated determination to unseat him, he may feel rather depressed.
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23 Август 2002
